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Impact of Economic Freedom, Regulatory Quality, and 
Taxation on the Per Capita Real Income: An Analysis for 
OECD Nations and Non-G8 OECD Nations  
By Richard J. Cebula (Jacksonville University) 
and J.R. Clark (University of Tennessee-Chattanooga) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past quarter of a century, numerous studies have been conducted expressly to 
investigate the impact of economic freedom on economic growth.  Most of these 
empirical studies find that there exists a strong, positive impact of economic freedom, 
especially a measure of overall economic freedom, on the rate of economic growth (Ali, 
1997; Ali and Crain, 2001, 2002; Ashby, Bueno, and Martinez, 2013; Belasen and Hafer, 
2013; Cebula, 2010, 2011; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Cebula, Clark, and Mixon, 
2013; Clark and Lawson, 2008; Cole, 2003; Dawson, 1998, 2003; De Haan and Strum, 
2000; Farr, Lord and Wolfenbarger, 1998; Goldsmith, 1995; Gwartney, Holcombe, and 
Lawson, 2006; Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe, 1999; Heckelman, 2000; Heckelman 
and Stroup, 2000; Liu and Riyanto, 2009; Mathers and Williamson, 2011; Mulholland 
and Hernandez-Julian, 2013; Norton, 1998; Powell, 2003: Tortensson, 1994).  
A good example of this literature is provided by Gwartney, Lawson and 
Holcombe (1999), who examine the importance of market institutions and economic 
freedom as prerequisites for economic growth, demonstrating that economic freedom is a 
significant determinant of economic growth, even when human capital, physical capital, 
and demographics are taken into account. Powell (2003) analyzes the relationship 
between freedom and economic growth in Ireland, reporting that as economic freedom 
increased, Ireland grew more rapidly. Reforms following Ireland’s fiscal crisis slashed 
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the government’s role in the economy, reduced large government budget deficits and tax 
rates, and improved the institutional environment in which entrepreneurs operate.  Cole 
(2003) evaluates the impact of economic freedom on economic growth under alternative 
theoretical frameworks, finding that economic freedom was robust with respect to major 
changes in all the model specifications and concludes that economic freedom was a 
significant factor in economic growth, regardless of the basic theoretical framework. Farr, 
Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998) use Granger-causality to examine the relationship 
between freedom and economic growth finding bi-directional causality.  That is, 
economic freedom Granger-causes the level of economic well-being (growth) as well as 
the reverse: the level of economic well-being (growth) is shown to Granger-cause 
economic freedom. Mathers and Williamson (2011) empirically test the effects of culture 
upon the success of capitalist institutions, specifically economic freedom, and 
demonstrate that culture enhances the effectiveness of capitalism and its subsequent 
impact on economic growth. Easterly (2011) finds that by examining many examples of 
rapid economic growth in both autocracy and democracy, democracy does significantly 
better than autocracy at reducing shocks from outside the political system and thus 
freedom is more important in producing growth than even good autocratic leadership.  
Indeed, despite the considerable variations in the modeling of economic growth amongst 
these various studies, economic freedom appears to play a consistently significant role in 
elevating that growth.  This generalization is predicated presumably upon the argument 
that increased economic freedom elevates the growth/pace of economic activity through 
incentives to work, invest, save, hire/dismiss, make market-based business decisions, and 
take risk in a market-based economy.    
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This study focuses on a similar, but not identical, potential impact of a higher 
level of economic freedom, namely, its impact on real income levels.1  Whereas the 
existing literature in fact does to some limited extent focus on the effect of higher levels 
of economic freedom on real income levels, this is not the principal emphasis of the most 
of the related literature. Indeed, by contrast to most of the published literature, the present 
study exclusively investigates (in part) the hypothesis that a higher overall level of 
economic freedom in an economy promotes a higher level of economic activity and hence 
yields a higher level of per capita real income (GDP) in that economy, ceteris paribus. 
Where this study principally differs from the existing related literature is that, although 
focusing on the overall Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom index, the present 
study deconstructs that overall economic freedom index to create an eight-component 
rather than ten-component economic freedom measure; for reasons provided below, two 
Heritage economic freedom measures are deleted from the overall measure, namely, 
fiscal freedom and business freedom. The present study relies heavily on data from the 
Heritage Foundation freedom index most widely cited in many previous economics 
studies. The Heritage Foundation freedom index not only provides data for more 
countries than other indexes but also contains variables calculated annually from its 
beginning in 1995 and thus provides a larger set of yearly data points for comparison. 
This index also attempts to maintain continuity of data over time by continually applying 
its revisions and improvements in the use of new methodology and new data retroactively 
                                                 
1 This emphasis on economic freedom and the per capita real income level is compatible, in principle, with 
that in Wiseman and Young (2011) for states within the U.S., and with certain other studies, including 
Grubel (1997), Islam 1996), and Nissan and Niroomand (2008). 
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to existing data sets in order to “attempt to make the scores continuous back to 1995” 
(Beach and Kane, 2007, p .55).  
 Furthermore, in the pursuit of a broader perspective and to compensate for the 
deletion of fiscal freedom and business freedom from the overall economic freedom 
index, this study also investigates two additional, complementary hypotheses, namely: (1) 
the higher the total tax burden level relative to GDP, the lower the per capita real income 
(GDP) level; and (2) higher quality regulation leads to a higher per capita real income 
(GDP) level.  
 To provide a broad and diverse context for the empirical analysis of these joint 
hypotheses, unlike most previous related studies, we focus on the member nations of the 
OECD over the study period beginning in 2003 and ending in 2007.2 Within this 
perspective, the present study provides an investigation into whether international per 
capita real income differentials (after purchasing-power-parity adjustments have been 
made) are a function of differential levels of economic freedom, differential tax burden 
levels, and differentials in the quality of government regulation.3  The analysis consists of 
a panel data-set estimated using the fixed effects model. A variety of specification 
estimates are provided to test the resiliency and consistency of the findings of the basic 
model.  An empirical analysis for all OECD nations for which all needed data are 
available is first provided; subsequently, as a test of robustness of the model, the various 
                                                 
2 In 2010, four additional nations joined the OECD, raising membership from 30 to 34. Unfortunately, there 
are data limitations for the earlier portion of the study period for these nations, as well as for Iceland, so 
that this study deals with 29 OECD nations from 2003 through 2007. 
3 In addition, this study investigates whether higher taxation reduces per capita real income and whether 
higher regulatory quality and greater political stability act to elevate per capita real income and thus act to 
create income differentials. 
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model specifications are estimated for all non-G8 OECD nations. Given the complexities 
involved in this project, the present study is proffered as a providing preliminary results. 
II. THE FRAMEWORK 
In this study, the per capita real income level is measured by the per capita real GDP level 
in each of the OECD nations over the study period from 2003 through 2007.  The per 
capita real income level, RPCY, is an economic variable that parallels, in principle, but 
nonetheless differs from what has been the focus of most of the more recent related 
studies on macroeconomic growth, namely, the percentage rate of change of per capita 
real GDP or simply the percentage rate of change of real GDP (Ali, 1997; Cebula, Clark, 
and Mixon, 2013;Cole, 2003; Dawson, 1998, 2003; Goldsmith, 1995; Norton, 1998; 
Tortensson, 1994).   
The value of per capita real GDP (income), RPCY, is made comparable across 
nations by PPP (purchasing-power-parity) adjustments.  Given the emphasis in this study 
on the role of economic freedom in determining the per capita real income level and 
hence international differentials thereof, the most fundamental hypothesis of this study is 
that per capita real income (as defined) depends directly upon economic freedom 
(FREEDOM) in each of its various studied forms, ceteris paribus. In addition, per capita 
real income is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of the tax burden, expressed as a 
percent of GDP, TAXREVGDP;4 this is because higher tax burdens reduce disposable 
income and limit the ability to purchase new goods and services and thereby 
reduce/restrict the level of economic activity. In addition, per capita real income is 
                                                 
4 As explained below, TAXREVGDP is adopted in lieu of The Heritage Foundation (2013) economic 
freedom referred to as “fiscal freedom.” 
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hypothesized to be an increasing function of regulatory quality, REGQUAL.5 This is 
because high quality regulation interferes less with the efficiency functioning of a 
market-based economy (Clark, Boettke, and Stringham, 2008; Ugur, 2009; Upadhyaya, 
Raymond, and Mixon, 1997).  
To provide a broad view of the factors influencing per capita real income, this 
study estimates a number of model specifications. The eclectic general framework for the 
analysis is expressed as follows:   
RPCYj= f(FREEDOMnj, TAXREVGDPj, REGQUALj, POLSTABj,  
OTHERj, TR)          (1) 
where RPCYj is the level of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per capita real income 
(GDP) in OECD nation j; FREEDOMnj refers to the value of  the economic freedom 
measure (index) n in nation j (n=8 in each of the primary estimations, as explained 
below); TAXREVGDPj is the ratio of all taxes in nation j to the GDP level within nation 
j, expressed as percent;  REGQUALj refers to the role played by government in the 
economy under the rubric of regulations and in fact is an index that measures the overall 
quality of those regulations in nation/region j; POLSTABj is an index that measures the 
degree of political stability in each nation/region j; OTHERj refers to the values of 
fundamental expressly economic control variables, namely, the unemployment rate 
and/or the real long term interest rate and/or the central government budget deficit in 
nation j; and TR is a linear trend variable to allow for trending of the variables in the 
analysis over time. Naturally, the explanatory variables are to be lagged in the empirical 
estimation process in order to avoid simultaneity problems. 
                                                 
5 As explained below, REGQUAL is adopted in lieu of The Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedom 
referred to as “business freedom.” 
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The general framework subsumed under equation (1) is to be used to generate a 
variety of model specifications to test the three central hypotheses outlined above, one of 
which is a model consisting (in addition to a trend variable) solely of the variables used to 
reflect economic freedom, regulatory quality, and taxation. In the other estimations, a 
“political control” variable (POLSTABj) and a variety of economic variables are 
introduced sequentially so that per capita real income is hypothesized also to be 
potentially a function of political stability as well as economic variables such as 
unemployment rates, real long term interest rates, and the central government budget 
deficit.  
1. Economic Freedom, Burden of Taxation, and Regulatory Quality 
This study considers the economic freedom indices developed by The Heritage 
Foundation (2013).6  Based on the hypotheses being investigated in this study, as stated 
above, the level of per capita real income is expected to be an increasing function of these 
indices of economic freedoms, ceteris paribus.    
Evidence in various forms of a positive impact of economic freedom on the level 
of per capita income can be found in several prior studies. These studies include a 
fundamentally graphical cross-country analysis by Grubel (1997, pp. 289-291, esp. 
Figure 1), from which he infers that countries with higher levels of economic freedom 
have higher per capita income levels. Another of these papers is a cross-section study by 
Islam (1996) of countries for the year 1992. The cross-section estimates in Islam (1996) 
                                                 
6 In an Appendix, as a rudimentary robustness test, an alternative measure of economic freedom is 
considered, namely, that computed by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2012). The Gwartney-Lawson-Hall 
(2012) measure is not strictly comparable to The Heritage Foundation (2013) measure, especially given the 
ways in which the latter is modified in this study. Nevertheless, the results using this alternative dataset 
provide strong empirical support for the principal findings in this study, i.e., the findings regarding the 
three central hypotheses proffered here. 
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find a direct impact of economic freedom on per capita income in low income countries 
and all countries taken as a group. Furthermore, a cross-section study of states in the U.S. 
by Wiseman and Young (2011) also finds evidence of a positive impact of economic 
freedom on per capita income. Other studies, including Cole (2003), secondarily address 
real income levels while focusing primarily upon economic growth. 
The present study extends these studies in a variety of ways. To begin with, this 
study differs with most related prior studies by focusing on the OECD nations. In 
addition, it estimates a balanced (for the study period 2003-2007) panel dataset by fixed 
effects. Furthermore, for all of the estimates provided in the main text, the present study 
constructs an overall average measure of economic freedom which expressly discards 
two of the ten Heritage Foundation (2013) economic freedoms, namely, fiscal freedom 
and business freedom, primarily to eliminate the multi-collinearity problems their 
presence creates and partly to replace them with arguably better variables to measure 
what the fiscal freedom and business freedom indices are intended to measure, namely, 
the ratio of all taxes to GDP (expressed as a percent) and a direct measure of regulatory 
quality, the principal component of business freedom. These substitutions are further 
explained later on in this section of the study. Finally, the present analysis provides 
estimates of a variety of model specifications which involve the introduction of a number 
of de facto economic control variables and a de facto political control variable to test the 
resilience  and consistency of the results adopting the Heritage Foundation (2013) data. 
This study first provides estimates for all of the OECD nations for which all of the data 
for the variables are available; subsequently, as a test of robustness, these same model 
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specifications are estimated but with the G8 nations excluded from the analysis, in 
principle following Islam (1996). 
Given this context, we first identify freedom from excessive government size, or 
simply government size freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2013), an index that reflects the 
degree of freedom in an economy from the burden of excessive government in terms of 
expenditures (i.e., freedom from government on the expenditure side).  Government 
outlays compete with private agents and interfere with natural market processes, prices, 
and interest rates by over-stimulating demand and diverting resources through “crowding 
out” effects (Abrams and Schmitz, 1978; Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1978). This 
economic freedom is labeled HECFR1. 
The trade freedom index reflects the openness of an economic system to imports 
of goods and services from other nations and the ability of citizens to interact freely as 
buyers and sellers in the global marketplace.  Government hindrance of the free flow of 
such commerce (through taxation of imports and/or exports, bans, quotas, and so forth) 
has a negative impact on the ability of individuals and firms to pursue their economic 
goals (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is denoted as HECFR2. 
A free citizenry requires a steady and reliable currency as a medium of exchange 
and as a store of value.  The monetary freedom index is an indicator of stable currency 
and market-determined prices.  A high degree of monetary freedom is characterized by an 
independent central bank, policies promoting low inflation, and the absence of price 
controls (Heritage Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is referred to here as 
HECFR3. 
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The investment freedom index is greater in a nation with (1) fewer restrictions on 
foreign investment, (2) fewer restrictions that tend to limit capital inflows and outflows, 
and (3) fewer restrictions that hinder the ability of capital to flow to its best and most 
efficient use.  Such restrictions interfere with the freedom of investors and firms seeking 
capital (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is referred to here as 
HECFR4. 
Nearly all nations impose some form of supervision/oversight on banking 
institutions and the providers of other financial services, including markets for equities. 
The financial freedom index is an indicator of the degree to which the financial sector of 
the economy is free from excessive banking and financial regulation (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is labeled HECFR5.  
Secure property rights provide citizens the confidence to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities, including commercial activities, saving, investing, and risk 
taking.  The ability to accumulate private property is a primary motivation, if not the 
primary motivation, for participation in a market economy; a “rule of law” that 
effectively protects property rights is critical to an efficient free market economy. The 
greater the protections afforded to property rights under the rule of law, the greater the 
property rights freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is 
referred to here as HECFR6. 
Political corruption by public officials manifests itself in many forms, including 
bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and graft, and it enables certain public officials to steal 
or otherwise profit illegitimately from public funds or the abuse of political power.  
Political corruption interferes with market efficiency.  The freedom from corruption 
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index indicates the degree to which an economy is free from such forms of corruption 
(Heritage Foundation, 2013). This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR7.7 
The labor freedom index is a composite index that reflects freedom from 
government wage and price controls and measures the ability of both workers and firms 
to interact freely without restrictions imposed by government. The greater the degree of 
labor freedom in an economy, the more efficient and productive is that economy 
(Heritage Foundation, 2013).   This economic freedom is referred to here as HECFR8.  
The fiscal freedom index (Heritage Foundation, 2013) reflects the freedom of 
individuals and firms to keep and control their income and wealth for their own 
use/benefit.  Fiscal freedom is a measure of freedom from the burden of government 
(from the revenue side): the lower this burden, the higher the value of the fiscal freedom 
index. Technically, fiscal freedom includes freedom from both the tax burden, in terms of 
both the top income tax rate (on corporations and individuals, taken separately) and the 
overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of a nation’s GDP.  The underlying idea is 
that higher taxation not only interferes with the ability of individuals and businesses to 
pursue their goals in the marketplace, it may also reduce the incentive to work, save, 
invest, or take risk. This economic freedom is labeled as HECFR9. 
The business freedom index reflects the individual’s right and ability to freely 
conduct entrepreneurial activities (i.e., to create, to operate and thereby make economic, 
financial, and management decisions, and close an enterprise without government 
interference).  It is argued that burdensome, redundant regulations are the most common 
barriers to the free conduct of entrepreneurial endeavors, and indeed are a de facto form 
                                                 
7 Related to the impact and nature of corruption, see the recent study by Goel and Nelson (2014). 
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of taxation that makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to produce goods and services 
(Heritage Foundation, 2013).  This economic freedom is labeled HECFR10. 
Of the ten economic freedoms measured above, two, HECFR9 and HECFR10, are 
of special interest here in terms of whether there is a reasonable alternative way in which 
to capture their essential significance but perhaps in either a more direct fashion and/or in 
a technically less problematic fashion, i.e., one that avoids multi-collinearity with one or 
more other variables in the system.  In particular, to measure economic freedom using 
The Heritage Foundation (2013) indices of economic freedom and to address the fact 
that, technically, the ten economic freedoms interact, i.e., are overlapping, although the 
exact mechanisms for this interaction are not easily identifiable or entirely clear (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013), we define, with two notable exceptions (fiscal freedom, HECFR9 and 
business freedom, HECFR10) the overall average economic freedom measure based on 
the Heritage Foundation (2013) indices, HFFREEDOMjt, as the average of the economic 
freedoms described above, where n denotes the nth economic freedom: 
        8 
HFFREEDOMjt = ƩHECFRnjt/8, j=1,…,29, t= 2003,…, 2007                             (2) 
            n=1 
 
 The principal reason for defining the overall freedom index without fiscal freedom 
(HECFR9) included is that HECFR9 is highly correlated (r = 0.670) with government 
size freedom, HECFR1, and therefore introduces a multi-collinearity problem. In 
addition, however, it is noteworthy that the HECFR9 index is constructed in part with an 
arguably excessive focus on just the top corporate and personal income tax brackets so 
that it may potentially fail to provide a systematic and purely objective inclusion of the 
remainder of the corporate and personal income tax structures, be they imposed by 
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central governments or sub-central government entities. In point of fact, there are also 
numerous other tax forms besides income taxation that arguably must be systematically 
considered when quantifying fiscal freedom. Accordingly, HECFR9 is replaced with a 
simple measure of the overall tax burden in each of the OECD nations, TAXREVGDPj. 
This substitute for fiscal freedom has two advantages over HECFR9: simplicity and 
comprehensiveness on the one hand, i.e., it is computed as simply the sum of all taxes in 
nation j expressed as a percent of GDP, and on the other hand, it is not highly correlated 
with HECFR9 (r =0.390). In the spirit of HECFR9, it is of course expected that real per 
capita income is a decreasing function of TAXREVGDP, ceteris paribus (Clark and 
Lawson, 2008; Yandle, 2013).8  This hypothesis is consistent with empirical results in the 
recent study by Afonso and Jalles (2014, p. 349), which finds “…government revenue 
has a negative impact on growth…”9 and in principle with the recent study of Indonesia 
by Parjiono, Beg, and Monypenny (2013). 
 The most fundamental reason for defining the overall freedom index with 
business freedom (HECFR10) excluded is the simple fact that this economic freedom 
measure, whose principal component is government regulation, is highly correlated (r = 
0.599) with property rights freedom. That said, in order to reflect at least in part the role 
of government in the economic environment as a regulator per se, this study adopts in 
place of HECFR10 the variable computed as “regulatory quality” by the World Bank 
Institute (2012, p. 1). This regulatory quality variable, expressed by the symbol 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, it can be easily argued that the higher the value of TAXREVGDP, the greater the incentive to 
evade taxes (Cebula, 1997), which in turn can compromise tax revenue forecasts and actual tax revenues. 
9 There is also reason to believe that high taxation distorts human migration and the efficiency effects of 
migration and thereby reduces economic growth (Saltz, 1998; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Damette and 
Fromentin, 2013), although such an issue is beyond the scope of this study. 
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REGQUALj in the present study, is an index that reflects “the ability of the government to 
provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector 
development” (World Bank Institute, 2012, p. 9). It is hypothesized that the greater/the 
higher the degree of regulatory quality in nation j, REGQUALj, the greater the level of 
economic activity and hence the greater the level of per capita income (GDP) in nation j 
in year t, ceteris paribus (Upadhyaya, Raymond, and Mixon, 1997; Ugur, 2009).10 
 Arguably, the most basic equation to be estimated in the context of this study 
involves the variable RPCYj and the three explanatory variables described above (along 
with a linear trend variable): 
RPCYj = f(HFFREEDOMnj, TAXREVGDPj, REGQUALj, TR),                (3)  
where fHFFREEDOMnj > 0, fTAXREVGDPj < 0, fREGQUALj > 0         
However, as observed above, several extensions of this basic specification are also to be 
estimated. Indeed, although estimations of this rudimentary framework are provided in 
this study, models with a number of expressly economic variables as well a variable 
reflecting political stability are provided first, since they are clearly more complete 
specifications and hence less subject to questions regarding omitted variable bias.  The 
identity of the variables used to generate broader model specifications are discussed 
below. 
2. Economic Variables and a Political Stability Control Variable  
In addition to the hypothesized impacts of economic freedom, taxes as a percent of GDP, 
and regulatory quality on real income, this study includes three expressly economic 
“control” variables and a political control variable. The explicitly economic control 
                                                 
10 The potential economic significance of regulation (good quality) is considered elsewhere in related 
studies (Clark, Boettke and Stringham, 2008; Yandle, 2013;). 
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variables are, as follows: the average percentage unemployment rate in country j, URj 
(Cebula, Clark, and Mixon, 2013); the average ex post real long term rate of interest in 
country j, RLONGINTj (Cecchetti, 2006; Mishkin, 2013; Taylor, 1999; Allison, 2013); 
and the central government budget deficit in country j, BUDDEFj, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1978; Abrams and Schmitz, 
1978).   
The unemployment rate variable controls for the expected negative influence of 
higher unemployment rates on per capita real income levels: the greater the percent of the 
labor force that is unemployed, the lower the per capita income, ceteris paribus (Cebula, 
Clark, and Mixon, 2013). Next, as observed by Cecchetti (2006, p. 555), “the economic 
decisions of households to save and of firms to invest depend on the real interest rate.” 
Similarly, Mishkin (2013, p. 609) observes that the traditional view is that “a fall in real 
interest rates…lowers the cost of borrowing, causing a rise in investment spending…and 
consumer durable expenditure.” According to the “conventional wisdom” then,  the 
higher the ex post real long term rate of interest, the lower the present value of investment 
for firms and hence the lower the rate of investment in new plant and equipment, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, consumption, particularly consumption of durable goods (including 
housing), is likely also a decreasing function of the ex post real long term rate of interest, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, the higher the ex post real long term interest rate, the lower the 
level of economic activity and hence the lower the per capita real income/GDP level. 
Finally, a higher government budget deficit is often argued to lead to “crowding out” of 
private sector investment and other spending and hence to induce a lower level of 
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economic activity and a lower per capita real GDP, ceteris paribus (Carlson and Spencer, 
1975; Cebula, 1978; Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). 
We also introduce a de facto political control variable for each nation, POLSTABj, 
which is an index of political stability and the absence of violence in those nations. It is 
hypothesized that economic prosperity for an economy as a whole should be an 
increasing function of political stability, which by its very nature, promotes orderly or 
lower-risk decision making and greater efficiency for markets to function in an economic 
system (World Bank Institute, 2012, p. 9) and thereby should act, ceteris paribus, to 
elevate per capita real income.   
For the interested reader, it is observed that the variables reflecting “regulatory 
quality” and “political stability” are in fact quite different. The variable used to measure 
regulatory quality, REGQUAL, reflects the ability of the government of a nation both to 
formulate and execute/implement sound, rational, and objective policies and regulations 
that not only permit but also promote private sector development and efficiency (World 
Bank, 2012, p. 5). By contrast, the variable used to reflect political stability, POLSTAB, 
actually measures the perceived likelihood that the government of a nation is vulnerable 
to being destabilized or even overthrown by either constitutional or violent means, with 
the latter including politically-motivated violence and terrorism (World Bank Institute, 
2012, p. 9). From a different perspective, to illustrate how statistically unrelated these 
two variables are, the zero-order correlation coefficient between them is nearly 0, i.e., r = 
-0.018.  
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III.  LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS PLS ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Predicated upon the eclectic framework of per capita real income/GDP determination 
described above, the following specification is estimated initially:11 
RPCYjt= f(HFFREEDOMj, REGQUALj, TAXREVGDPj, POLSTABj,URj,  
     RLONGINTRj, BUDDEFj,TR)           (4) 
 
where it is hypothesized that: 
 
fHFFREEDOMj>0, fREGQUALj>0, fTAXREVGDPj<0, fPOLSTABj>0, fURj<0, fRLONGINTRj<0, fBUDDEFj<0    
Data for each of the economic freedom variables/indices (HFFREEDOM) initially 
considered were obtained from The Heritage Foundation (2013); data for the real per 
capita income variable (RPCY) were obtained from the International Monetary Fund 
(2013); data for the variables TAXREVGDP, UR, BUDDEF, and RLONGINTR (the latter 
more specifically being the percentage nominal average annual long term interest rate 
yield minus the percentage annual inflation rate) were obtained from the OECD (2013); 
and data for the governance indices for regulatory quality (REGQUAL) and political 
stability (POLSTAB) were obtained from the World Bank Institute (2012). Finally, TR is 
a linear trend variable.  Descriptive statistics for each of the non-trend variables in the 
analysis are provided in Table 1.12  As observed earlier in this study, the explanatory 
variables are lagged so as to avoid simultaneity issues. 
Equation (4), expressed in linear form, was estimated by PLS (panel least 
squares), first using the random effects model and then using the fixed effects model.  For 
                                                 
11 HFFREEDOM is adopted as the symbol for the overall average level of economic freedom based on The 
Heritage Foundation (2013) indices. As observed in footnote 5, in subsequent estimations found in the 
Appendix of this study, an alternative measure of economic freedom based on Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 
(2012), GLHECONFREE, is substituted for HFFREEDOM. 
12 A complete dataset for Iceland was unavailable, so that only 29 of the 30 member OECD nations over the 
study period could be studied over the 2003-2007 period. 
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this linear specification, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was performed, 
and it generated an F-statistic with a p = .0436, so that the study adopted the fixed effects 
model.  Similarly, all of the equation specifications estimated in this study were estimated 
by PLS (panel least squares), first using the random effects model and then using the 
fixed effects model.  In each linear specification, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 
1978) was performed, and it generated an F-statistic with a p < 0.05, so that the study 
adopted the fixed effects model for all the model specifications provided in this study. 
Equation (4) is estimated adopting the White (1980) cross-section 
heteroskedasticity correction.13 These results are provided in column (a) of Table 2, 
where all seven of the estimated coefficients for the non-trend explanatory variables 
exhibit the expected signs.  Of these seven coefficients, four are statistically significant at 
the 1% level, and one is statistically significant at beyond the 5% level, i.e. at the 3% 
level. The coefficients on the budget deficit and unemployment variables fail to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, as hypothesized, these fixed effects results 
reveal that the per capita real income level among OECD nations during the study period 
is an increasing function of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability 
and a decreasing function of the tax burden (as a percent of GDP), as well as the ex post 
real long term interest rate. These results, as they pertain to economic freedom, quality 
regulation, and the tax burden, provide strong initial support for the three central 
hypotheses being investigated in this study. More specifically, a one unit increase in The 
Heritage Foundation overall economic freedom index would elevate per capita real 
income by $510, ceteris paribus. Therefore, a rise in this Heritage Foundation (2013) 
                                                 
13 All of the estimations in this study adopt the White (1980) cross-section heteroskedasticity correction. 
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measure of economic freedom index of 10 units would be expected to elevate per capita 
real income by approximately $5,103, ceteris paribus. In addition, a rise in the 
REGQUAL index of one unit would raise per capita real income by $621, ceteris paribus, 
whereas a rise of 1% in the percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce per capita real 
income by $369, ceteris paribus.  
Meanwhile, the coefficient of determination values (the R2 and the adjusted R2) 
imply that the model explains nearly three-fifths of the variation in the dependent 
variable, per capita real income (GDP).  In addition, the F-ratio is statistically significant 
at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. The interested reader is 
referred to the correlation matrix in Table 3, where the absence of a multi-collinearity 
problem in the model is revealed.  
In order to test the consistency and robustness of these results, several additional 
model specifications are estimated below. Refer now to column (b) of Table 2, where the 
specification deletes the statistically insignificant [in column (a)] budget deficit variable, 
BUDDEF. This estimation is a de facto robustness test, albeit a modest one, of the central 
findings shown in column (a) of Table 2. In the fixed effects results shown in column (b) 
of Table 2, all six of the estimated non-trend coefficients exhibit the expected signs; 
furthermore, four are statistically significant at the 1% level, and one is statistically 
significant at the 3% level. Only the coefficient on the unemployment rate variable fails 
to be statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, the R2 value and adjusted R2 
value imply that the explanatory variables in the model explain in excess of half of the 
variation in the variable RPCY. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically significant at beyond 
the 1% level.  These results imply that the per capita real income level among OECD 
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nations during the 2003-2007 study period was found to be an increasing function of 
economic freedom, regulatory quality, and political stability, while being a decreasing 
function of the tax burden (as a percent of GDP) and the ex post real long term interest 
rate. In this estimate, a one unit increase in the modified overall economic freedom index 
would appear to elevate per capita real income by $337.  Other results of interest in 
column (b) would be that a rise in the REGQUAL index of one unit would raise per capita 
real income by $628 [a result very similar in magnitude to that in column (a)], while a 
rise of 1% in the percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would reduce per capita real income by 
$452. These three results parallel those provided in column (a), thereby lending further 
support for the three basic hypotheses being tested in this study, although the results are 
not of the same magnitude. 
In column (c) of Table 2, another specification is estimated, this model being one 
that excludes both of the previously statistically insignificant (in this study) variables, 
namely, BUDDEF and UR. In this estimation, all five of the explanatory variables exhibit 
the hypothesized signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, this estimate 
implies that per capita real GDP in OECD nations over the 2003-2007 study period was 
an increasing function of economic freedom (as reconfigured in the present study), 
regulatory quality, and political stability, while being a decreasing function of the tax 
burden (as a percent of GDP) and the real long term interest rate. Hence, the model 
estimated in column (c) of Table 2 reaffirms the empirical support for the three 
hypotheses under examination in this study. 
To further seek insight into the roles of economic freedom, the burden of taxation, 
and regulatory quality on per capita real GDP, the estimate in column (d) of Table 2 
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estimates a model that further deletes the last of the economic variables considered here, 
i.e., the long term rate of interest. In this fixed effects estimate, all four of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, the per capita real GDP in OECD nations is an increasing function of political 
stability, as consistently shown in columns (a) through (c) of Table 2. More relevant is 
the fact that, once again, support for our three basic hypotheses is obtained: real per 
capita GDP in OECD nations over the 2003-2007 study period is shown to be an 
increasing function of economic freedom and quality regulation and a decreasing 
function of the tax burden.   
Finally, in column (e), results are provided for the estimation of another model, 
one that discards all of the variables except those for economic freedom, regulatory 
quality, and the tax burden. Note that in this estimate, there still is strong empirical 
support for the three hypotheses of interest here. Thus, based on this estimate, per capita 
real income is an increasing function of economic freedom (at the 5% statistical 
significance level) and regulatory quality (at the 1% statistical significance level) and a 
decreasing function (at the 1% statistical significance level). However, it is noteworthy 
that the F-statistic, while still statistically significant at the 1% level, is nonetheless of far 
lesser magnitude than in all four of the other model estimations in Table 2. Furthermore, 
the coefficients of determination (R2 and adjusted R2) are only 0.18 and 0.14, 
respectively, also modest fractions of their counterparts in the previous four model 
estimations. Hence, whereas this model is theoretically potentially useful insofar as it 
affirms the previous four sets of results for economic freedom, quality regulation, and the 
tax burden, it is realistically manifesting omitted variable bias.  
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Put somewhat differently, the results in columns (a) through (d) clearly represent 
models with greater dependability than the model expressed in column (e). Indeed, it is 
suggested here that the results shown in columns (a), (b), (c), and (d) all provide sound 
and useful insights into the three issues at the heart of this study. That said, the next 
section of this study provides a test of the robustness of the results in Table 2 regarding 
the impacts of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the burden of taxes.    
IV. ROBUSTNESS TESTING: OECD NATIONS EXCLUSIVE OF G8 
NATIONS 
 
In section of the study, we seek to provide a stronger robustness test of the basic 
model than simply the estimation of sequentially different models, as shown in columns 
(a) through (e) of Table 2. In particular, the models estimated in this section of the study 
differ in an important way from those estimated in the previous section by omitting all of 
the G8 nations from the estimations. Thus, to the extent that per capita real GDP in G8 
nations may have been significantly influenced (or disproportionately influenced) by 
economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the tax burden and therefore biased the 
results shown in the various model estimates summarized in Table 2 , the new estimates 
provided in this section of the study test the basic hypotheses being studied while 
controlling for said (potential) bias/biases by estimating the very same models but only  
for non-G8 member nations of the OECD over the 2003-2007 study period.   
Accordingly, equation (4) was estimated by fixed effects, adopting the White 
(1980) cross-section heteroskedasticity correction, for the non-G8 OECD nations for the 
2003-2007 study period. These results are provided in column (a) of Table 4. As shown, 
all seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with two statistically 
significant at the 1% level, one statistically significant at the 2.5% level, and one 
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statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, after deleting the G8 nations from the 
OECD membership study sample, per capita real GDP is found to be an increasing 
function of economic freedom (5% statistical significance level), regulatory quality (2.5% 
statistical significance level), and political stability (1% statistical significance level), 
while being a decreasing function of the tax burden as a percent of GDP (1% statistical 
significance level; moreover, it is again noteworthy that multi-collinearity was not a 
problem. In terms of the three central hypotheses of interest in this study, as shown in this 
estimate, a one unit increase in The Heritage Foundation overall economic freedom index 
would elevate per capita real income by $399, ceteris paribus. Therefore, a rise in this 
Heritage Foundation (2013) measure of economic freedom index of 10 units would be 
expected to elevate per capita real income by approximately $3,991, ceteris paribus. In 
addition, a rise in the REGQUAL index of one unit would raise per capita real income by 
$937, ceteris paribus, whereas a rise of 1% in the percentage ratio of taxes to GDP would 
reduce per capita real income by $748, ceteris paribus. Thus, this test of robustness 
reveals that there is indeed strong evidence supporting the three basic hypotheses upon 
which this study has focused, even when considering only non-G8 OECD member 
nations.         
The models estimated for Table 4 parallel those in Table 2 except insofar as those 
in Table 2 relate to all OECD members (except Iceland, due to data unavailability issues) 
whereas the models in Table 4 exclude all of the G8 OECD members (as well as Iceland). 
Examination of columns (b) through (d) of Table 4 reveals a distinct pattern, namely, in 
all three estimates, it is found that: the estimated coefficients on the economic freedom 
variable are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; those on the regulatory 
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quality variable are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; those on the tax 
burden variable are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level; and, finally, the 
estimated coefficients on the political stability variables are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Moreover, for all four of these variables, the magnitude on the 
coefficients is remarkably stable. Lastly, the results in column (e) of Table 4 also exhibit 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level for economic freedom 
and at the 1% level for regulatory quality and the tax burden. Arguably, then, among 
other things, it can be inferred that the results in Table 4 for the non-G8 nations offer 
further strong empirical support for our three basic hypotheses of interest in this study. In 
other words, there is affirmation of the robustness of the results in Table 2 that economic 
growth is an increasing function of economic freedom and regulatory quality and a 
decreasing function of the tax burden.14   
V. SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
This preliminary study of the impacts of economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the 
relative burden of taxation on the level of per capita real income/GDP among OECD 
nations over the 2003-2007 period adopts a modified version of the overall economic 
freedom index computed by The Heritage Foundation (2013), one with the fiscal freedom 
and business freedom indices removed. This study then provides PLS fixed effects 
estimates for five linear specifications/models. Each nation during this time frame can be 
regarded either as a nation per se or as a de facto “economic region” within the OECD. 
The analysis first focuses upon all of the OECD nations and then, as a robustness test, 
subsequently focuses only on non-G8 OECD member nations. The estimations in this 
                                                 
14 Interestingly, the mean per capita real GDP for the OECD nations without the G-nations is 19,738 and 
the mean is 15,930.  
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study all provide strong empirical support for the three central hypotheses proffered here, 
namely: (1) the higher the overall degree of economic freedom; the higher the per capita 
real income (GDP) level; (2) the higher the level of regulatory quality, the higher the level 
of per capita real income (GDP); and (3) the higher the overall tax burden, expressed as a 
percent of GDP, the lower the level of per capita real income (GDP). For the interested 
reader, a further reality check, i.e., another robustness test (albeit rudimentary), one that 
adopts fixed-effects estimations involving a different economic freedom dataset, namely, 
the overall economic freedom index by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2012), is provided 
in the Appendix. The findings from those additional estimations also yield support for 
these three basic hypotheses.    
Naturally, these conclusions are at least somewhat preliminary. Alternative model 
specifications involving additional or different explanatory variables could yield useful 
insights. In addition, future related research also could undertake the adoption/study of 
alternative datasets and/or alternative study periods. Thus, although these results appear 
to suggest a strong relationship between the level of per capita real income (GDP) on the 
one hand and economic freedom, regulatory quality, and the overall tax burden on the 
other hand, this topic requires further scrutiny and formal investigation.  
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix provides an additional set of estimates to test the robustness of the 
findings in the main text of this study. These estimates substitute the Gwartney, Lawson, 
and Hall (2012) measure of overall economic freedom, GLHECFREEDOM, for the 
modified version of the overall economic freedom index from The Heritage Foundation 
(2013) adopted in this study, HFFREEDOM, in equation (4), and then provide fixed 
effects estimates of the equation, first for all of the OECD nations (except Iceland) and 
then for only the non-G8 OECD nations (except Iceland). These estimation results are 
found in columns (a) and (b) of Table 5. As shown in both of these estimates, there is 
strong additional support for the three hypotheses focused upon in this study. Namely, in 
both of these estimates, for the 2003-2007 study period, the level of per capita real GDP 
is an increasing function of economic freedom and regulatory quality and a decreasing 
function of the ratio of taxes to the GDP level.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable    Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RPCY (OECD)   27,101  12,013 
 
HFFREEDOM   69.992  8.192 
 
REGQUAL    1.296  0.438 
 
TAXREVGDP    36.01  7.202 
 
POLSTAB    0.771  0.53 
 
UR     6.702  3.288 
     
RLONGINTR    3.544  2.293  
 
BUDDEF    4.85  6.56    
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Table 2. Linear Estimates (Fixed Effects)  
Dependent Variable:  RPCY for All OECD NATIONS           
Economic Freedom Measure: Heritage Foundation     
                                                
Explanatory  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Variables   
 
HFFREEDOM 510.34*** 333.05*** 358.7*** 3017.5*** 224.2*  
  (3.27)  (3.02)  (3.23)  (2.67)  (1.99)   
 
REGQUAL 621.73* 628.19* 804.88*** 854.09*** 1,093.21*** 
  (2.24)  (2.20)  (3.37)  (3.33)  (4.38) 
          
TAXREVGDP -369.2*** -452.66*** -511.93*** -475.91*** -766.55*** 
  (-2.63)  (-3.43)  (-3.47)  (-3.07)  (-3.73) 
          
POLSTAB 999.97*** 930.70*** 904.33*** 1,227.2***  
  (4.12)  (3.75)  (3.88)  (6.38) 
          
UR  -359.6  -406.6   
  (-1.03)  (-1.18) 
         
RLONGINTR -1,739*** -1,685*** -1,701***   
  (-3.12)  (-3.02)  (-3.07) 
         
BUDDEF -270.54   
  (-1.22) 
 
TR  -1,953# -1,531  -1,768# -1,025  -961 
  (-1.79)  (-1.47)  (-1.74)  (-0.90)  (-0.70) 
 
Constant -866.5  725.1  402.2  -742.0  -2,738.2# 
  (-0.62)  (0.67)  (0.39)  (-0.70)  (1.95) 
  
R2  0.57  0.54  0.53  0.46  0.18 
adjR2  0.52  0.50  0.50  0.43  0.14 
F    11.70*** 13.20*** 15.08*** 13.82*** 4.41***  
  
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; 
*statistically significant at 5% level; #statistically significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
  HFFREEDOM  REGQUAL  TAXREVGDP  POLSTAB  UR RLONGINTR BUDDEF  
  
 
HFFREEDOM  1.000 
 
REGQUAL  -0.109 1.000 
          
TAXREVGDP  -0.140 0.416  1.000 
          
POLSTAB  -0.179 0.003  -0.247 1.000   
          
UR   -0.185 -0.353  -0.063 0.033 1.000  
         
RLONGINTR  0.180 -0.109  -0.001 -0.473 -0.023 1.000 
         
BUDDEF  -0.298 -0.237  -0.047 0.086 0.318 0.017 1.000 
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Table 4. Alternative Estimates (Fixed Effects)  
Dependent Variable:  RPCY for OECD Nation, G8 Nations Omitted           
Economic Freedom Measure: Heritage Foundation     
                                                
Explanatory (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Variables   
 
HFFREEDOM 399.05* 532.01*** 519.66*** 541.4*** 437.3*  
  (2.00)  (3.61)  (3.74)  (3.85)  (2.20)   
 
REGQUAL 936.53** 1,004.7*** 904.0*** 883.1*** 1,182.3*** 
  (2.36)  (2.65)  (2.77)  (2.75)  (2.92) 
          
TAXREVGDP -748.4*** -674.5*** -640.7*** -656.0*** -1.019.6*** 
  (-3.40)  (-3.06)  (-2.90)  (-2.99)  (-3.87) 
          
POLSTAB 1,584.9*** 1,657.5*** 1,672.5*** 1,535.3*** 
  (5.32)  (5.51)  (5.87)  (6.19) 
          
UR  -246.8  231.7 
  (-0.54)  (0.53) 
         
RLONGINTR -789.1  713.7  723.03 
  (-1.14)  (1.10)  (1.11) 
         
BUDDEF -180.13 
  (-0.63) 
 
TR  -144.4  -261.8  -116.2  -440.1  -361.4 
  (-0.08)  (-0.16)  (-0.07)  (-0.27)  (-0.19) 
 
Constant -2,500.0 -3,862.6** 3,678.6** -3,192.3** 1,161.6 
  (-1.30)  (-2.47)  (-2.49)  (-2.33)  (0.62) 
  
R2  0.43  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.18 
adjR2  0.36  0.37  0.38  0.38  0.14 
F    6.61*** 8.21*** 9.65*** 11.40*** 4.40***  
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; 
*statistically significant at 5% level. 
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Table 5. Additional Estimates (Fixed Effects)  
Dependent Variable:  RPCY            
Economic Freedom Measure: Gwartney-Lawson-Hall   
   
All G8 Nations All OECD Nations, G8 
Nations Omitted                                                
Explanatory   (a)     (b)   
Variables   
 
GLHECONFREE 682.0**    1.259.8***   
   (2.34)     (3.32)     
 
REGQUAL  785.08***    1,076.7*** 
   (3.06)     (2.70) 
          
TAXREVGDP  -384.1**    -1.399*** 
   (-2.47)     (-5.69) 
          
POLSTAB  411.18#    -1,652 
   (1.66)     (-0.44) 
          
UR   -133.6***    58.75 
   (-4.60)     (0.16) 
         
RLONGINTR  -1,355.6***    -1,787*** 
   (-5.37)     (-11.70) 
         
BUDDEF  -159.13    -393.24** 
   (-0.63)     (-2.43) 
 
TR   -485.3     -1,460 
   (-0.27)     (-0.64) 
 
Constant  -7,786     -9,801 
   (-0.35)     (-0.33) 
  
R2   0.71     0.71   
adjR2   0.66     0.66   
F     13.91***    13.99*** 
           
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 2.5% level; 
*statistically significant at 5% level; #statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
